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IN THE SUPREME COUPT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JACK S. COOPER, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20703 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant presents two issues for review by this Court: 
1. Did the District Court err when it ruled that a 
lender must ccnirence foreclosure within one (1) year after 
learning cf a violation of the "due-on-sale" clause 
contained m the lender's Deed of Trust? 
2. Did the District Court err when it held that there 
were legal grounds for an award of attorney's fees to 
Plaintiff/Respondent? 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
j 
On June 5, 1984, the Appellant, Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan Association (hereinafter referred to as "Deseret 
Federal"), recorded a Notice of Default affecting real 
property located in Utah County, Utah. The Notice of 
Default alleged a violation in the "due-on-sale" clause 
contained in Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust securing the 
subject real property. (R.7-8). On August 29, 1984, the 
Respondent, Jack S. Cooper (hereinafter referred to as 
"Cooper11) , filed a Complaint in Fourth Judicial District 
Court seeking an injunction to enjoin Deseret Federal from 
foreclosing under the recorded Notice of Default. (R.l-6). 
A non-jury trial was held on February 28, 1985. The Court 
took the matter under advisement. (R.91-95). On April 5, 
1985, the Court rendered its Decision that Cooper was 
entitled to a permanent injunction against Deseret Federal, 
plus his costs and reasonable attorney's fees. (R.143-150). 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
reflecting the Court's decision were entered on May 17, 
1985. (R. 153-160). It is from that Judgment that Deseret 
Federal now appeals by seeking a reversal. (P.163-164). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Deseret Federal was the beneficiary and trustee under a 
Deed of Trust executed by Cooper and his wife on jApril 15, 
1976. The Deed of Trust secured a Trust Deed Note in the 
amount of $315,000.00 by transferring, in trust, real 
property located in Utah County, Utah. (R.58-62). The real 
property is an apartment complex located at 625 North 
Monterey Drive, Orem, Utah. (F. 177-178). 
Contained in the subject Deed of Trust is a paragraph 
commonly referred to as a lfdue-on-sale,f clause. The 
paragraph reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
If all or any part of the property or an 
interest therein is sold or transferred by 
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Borrower without Lender's prior written 
consent , Lender may, at Lenderf s 
option, declare all the sums secured by 
this Deed of Trust to be immediately due 
and payable, (R.61). 
(A complete copy of the subject "due-on-sale" clause is 
attached hereto as Appendix "A"). 
Cooper sold the subject real property to a Gary Douglas 
Ford (hereinafter referred to as "Ford") by Uniform F.eal 
Estate Contract in Kay of 1978. Neither Cooper, nor Ford, 
obtained the "prior written consent" of Deseret Federal for 
the sale. (R.144). Thus, the May, 1978 sale of the 
apartment complex violated the "due-on-sale" clause 
contained in Deseret Federal's Deed of Trust. 
Deseret Federal was first informed of a transfer of 
Cooper's apartment complex when the lender received an 
insurance binder naming Ford as the owner in April of 1979. 
(R.15M. Deseret Federal was also informed of the transfer 
through communivations which occurred between Ford, Cooper 
and employees of Deseret Federal throughout the year 1981. 
(P.154) . 
In June of 1981, Deseret Federal made the decision to 
accelerate the obligation secured by the Deed of Trust by 
reason of the default caused by the transfer of the 
apartment complex from Cooper to Ford. A letter declaring 
such an acceleration was mailed on or about June 22, 1981. 
However, neither Cooper, nor Ford, claimed the mailed 
letter. (F.53-54, 65-66). A follow-up letter was sent to 
Cooper and Ford on or about August 18, 1981, which again 
- « / — 
stated Deseret Federal's desire to accelerate the subject 
loan. (R.144 and Defendant's Exhibit #16). 
Sometime after mailing the August 18, 1981 letter, 
Deseret Federal began holding discussions with Ford about 
assuming the Cooper loan. In December of 1981, Ford made 
formal application with Deseret Federal to assume the loan. 
(R.144). Negotiations between Ford and Deseret Federal 
continued. Terms of the Ford assumption were completed 
sometime in the Spring of 1982. A critical part of 
assumption was that Cooper would transfer to Ford any escrow 
funds Deseret Federal held in connection with the subject 
loan. Papers were drafted to consummate the assumption. 
However, in Hay of 1982, Cooper refused to consent to a 
transfer of the escrcw funds to Ford. Thus, the 
"due-on-sale" assumption loan by Ford and resulting ,fcureM 
of che defaulted clause failed to occur. (R.284-288). 
Ey Spring of 1982, an additional default in the terms 
of Deseret Federal's loan had occurred. Payments of 
principal and interest on the Trust Deed Note had become 
delinquent. Further, Ford had failed to make timely 
payments to Cooper pursuant to their Uniform Peal Estate 
Contract. On October 1, 1982, Ford filed a petition in 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
(R.144-145) . As a result thereof, both Deseret Federal and 
Cooper were automatically stayed from foreclosing their 
respective interests in the apartment complex. 11 U.S.C.§ 
362(a)(4). 
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On or about September 18, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court 
entered an Order modifying the Bankruptcy Court's automatic 
stay and permitting Cooper to complete foreclosure of his 
Uniform Real Estate Contract on the subject apartment 
complex. An action to foreclose said contract had been 
filed by Cooper against Ford in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court. (R.71-73). The Cooper foreclosure was completed on 
February 1, 1984 when Cooper purchased the apartment complex 
at sheriff's sale. (R.155). As a result of the sheriff's 
sale, the bankruptcy stay no longer prevented Deseret 
Federal from enforcing its rights under the subject Deed of 
Trust by foreclosure since the apartment complex was no 
longer property of the Ford bankruptcy estate. 11 
U.S.C.§362(a). 
On February 10, 1984, Deseret Federal, by letter, again 
asserted its right to accelerate the loan by reason of the 
default in the "due-on-sale" clause. (R.67-68). That on or 
about April 16, 1984, Cooper tendered to Deseret Federal 
sufficient funds to bring the payments of principal, 
interest aid escrow current on the subject loan. However, 
the tender was conditioned upon Deseret Federal waiving the 
provisions of the "due-on-sale" clause. Thus, the tender 
was refused. (F.155,325-332) . Cooper did bring the 
payments of interest and principal current unconditionally 
during the course of this litigation. (R.156). 
Deseret Federal and Cooper were unable to resolve their 
dispute over the "due-on-sale" violation. Thus, Deseret 
Federal recorded a Notice of Default on June 5, 1984, 
(R.69-70). Cooper filed a Complaint against Deseret Federal 
requesting an injunction to prevent Deseret Federal from 
foreclosing its Deed of Trust by reason of the default under 
the "due-on-sale" clause. The District Court granted such 
an injunction and awarded Cooper his costs and attorney's 
fees. (R.159-160). 
Deseret Federal here seeks a reversal of the District 
Court's Judgment. Such a reversal would allow Deseret 
Federal to accelerate the subject loan by reason of the 
"due-on-sale" clause violation, to complete the foreclosure 
process and collect its reasonable attorney's fees. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
After the transfer of the subject real property had 
occurred in violation of the "due-on-sale" clause contained 
in Deed of Trust, Deseret Federal timely accelerated the 
subject loan by commencing a non-judicial foreclosure of the 
Deed of Trust. The District Court erred when it ruled that 
Deseret Federal must commence foreclosure of the subject 
loan within one year after being informed of a violation in 
the "due-on-sale" clause under the Deed of Trust. Further, 
the District Court erred when it held that there were 
sufficient legal grounds for the awarding of attorney's fees 
to Cooper. There is no statutory or contractual basis for 
such an award. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DESERET FEDERAL TIMELY ACCELERATED ITS LOAN 
FOLLOWING A VIOLATION IN THE LOAN'S 
"DUE-ON-SALE" CLAUSE, 
Many Courts have recently had the opportunity to 
redefine the law regarding enforceability of and 
interpretation of "due-on-sale" clauses contained in Deeds 
of Trust. In a very thoughtful analysis, this Court held in 
Redd v. Western Savings j.nd Loan Company, 646 P.2d 761 
(Utah, 1982), that absent legislative restrictions, a 
ffdue-on-saletf clause is enforceable as part of a bargained 
agreement. Since Deseret Federal is a federally chartered 
savings and loan association, any legislative restriction to 
the effectiveness cf the "due-on-sale11 clause contained in 
the subject Deed cf Trust must be found in federal law. See 
Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Associa_tion v. Peginald D. 
De Sa Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
Legistative restrictions to enforceability of "due-
on-sale" clauses were not the basis cf Plaintiff Jack S. 
Cooper's complaint against Deseret Fed|eral. Instead, Cooper 
argued that Deseret Federal waited too long to accelerate 
its loan because of the default in the "due-on-sale" clause; 
and thus, by reason of laches, estoppel and/or waiver, 
Deseret Federal is now barred from accelerating the loan. 
Conversely, Deseret Federal argues that it timely 
accelerated the subject loan after learning of the real 
property transfer from Cooper to Ford. The District Court 
concluded that Deseret Federal should have recorded its 
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Notice of Default, accelerating the loan, within one year 
after learning of the offensive transfer. Such a conclusion 
is reversible error. 
The recording of a Notice of Default, along with all 
non-judicial foreclosure procedures, is governed by Utah's 
Trust Deed Statute, U.C. A. §§57-1-19, et. seq. (1953, as 
airended) . That statute provides the specific time frame 
within which a lender must record a Notice of Default. 
U.C.A.§57-1-34 reads as follows: 
The trustee's sale of property under a trust 
deed shall be made, or an action to foreclosure 
a trust deed as provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property 
shall be commenced, within the period prescribed 
by l&w for the commencement of_an action" on 
trie obligation" secured by tKe~trust~ deed. [Emphasis 
added]. 
The obligation secured by the subject Deed of Trust is 
a Trust Deed Note, a written obligation. Thus, the time by 
which Deseret Federal must conduct its trustee's sale under 
the recorded Notice of Default is governed by 
U.C.A.§78-12-23(2), which reads as follows: 
Within six years - Within six years... 
(2) An action upon any contract, obligation 
or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing, except those mentioned in the 
preceding section. 
Because Deseret Federal first learned of the default by 
Cooper of the "due-on-sale" clause in April, 1979, Deseret 
Federal would have, by reason of the appropriate Statute of 
Limitations, until April, 1985, to conduct its trustee's 
sale. Further, this period ot time was tolled because 
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Deseret Federal has been enjoined from conducting a 
trustee's sale by the District Court since September 2, 1984 
and Deseret Federal was stayed by Ford's Bankruptcy from 
recording a Notice of Default between October 1, 1982 and 
February 1, 1984. 
Cooper has asserted that the doctrine of laches, not 
the Statute of Limitations, restricts the time within which 
Deseret Federal must accelerate its loan. See Malouff v. 
Midland Federal Savings and Loan Association,, 509 P.2d 1240 
(Colo., 1973). However, such an argument is counter to Utah 
case law. In F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 
17 U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, (1965), the Plaintiff had filed 
a mortgage foreclosure action against Defendant. The 
Defendant raised the doctrine of laches as a defense to the 
mortgage foreclosure. This Court rejected such a defense 
and held: 
Neither is the defense of laches of any 
avail to the defendant. Sec. 78-12-23, U.C.A. 
1953, which provides for a six year statute of 
limitations en obligations in writing is 
applicable zo the promissory note and to the 
mortgage. It had two years yet to run when this 
action was commenced. Even though the foreclosure 
action is equitable in nature, it is practically 
the invariable rule that laches cannot be a 
defense before the statutory limitations 
has expired. 404 P.2d at 673. 
The legislature had established what it felt to be a 
"reasonable time11 within which a lender must commence a 
non-judicial foreclosure when it enacted U.C.A-. §57-1-34 and 
§78-12-23. It is inappropriate for a Court to substitute 
its concept of a "reasonable time11 for that of the 
- Q _ 
legislature. Yet, that is exactly what the District Court 
did when it ruled that Deseret Federal should have recorded 
its Notice of Default within one(l) year of learning of the 
subject property transfer . Thus, this Court should reverse 
the District Court's Judgment. 
During the course of litigation on this matter, Cooper 
has often used the terms "waiver", "estoppel" and "laches" 
as if these concepts were interchangeable. In fact, these 
legal concepts are very different. However, it is Deseret 
Federal's position that the facts as found by the District 
Court support a conclusion that Deseret Federal did not 
waive its rights under the subject "due-on-sale" clause and 
that Deseret Federal is not estopped from asserting its 
rights under that clause. 
This Court has defined waiver in the case of Phoenix 
Ins. Co. v. Health, 90 Ut 187, 61 P.2d 308 (1936). In that 
case, the Court held: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right...To constitute a waiver, 
there must be an existing right, benefit, 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence 
and an intention to relinquish it. It must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express 
or implied. 61 P.2d 312. 
The evidence before the District Court clearly 
indicates that Deseret Federal took express steps to 
demonstrate that it was not going to waive its rights under 
the "due-on-sale" clause. At every opportunity, Deseret 
Federal stated that it had accelerated the subject loan by 
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reason of default under the "due-on-sale" clause. The only 
evidence that Cooper presented in support of his claim that 
Deseret Federal waived its rights under the clause is the 
fact that Deseret Federal had accepted payments of principal 
and interest under the subject note after having accelerated 
the loan. However, the mere acceptance of principal and 
interest payments is not a waiver of any rights under a 
Mdue-on-saleM clause. Bakker v. Empire Savings and Loan 
Association, 634 P.?d 1021 (Colo., 1981). 
The doctrine of estoppel, like the doctrine of waiver, 
applies only when certain criteria are satisfied. This 
Court described the doctrine of estoppel in J. P. Koch, Inc. 
v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah, 1975), as 
follows: 
It is a doctrine of equity to prevent one party 
from deluding or inducing another into a 
position where he will unjustly suffer loss. 
On applicable here, the test is whether there 
is conduct, by act or omission, by which one 
party knowingly leads another party, reasonably 
acting thereon, to take some course of action, 
which will result in his detriment or damage 
if the first party is permitted to repudiate 
or deny his conduct or representation. 534 
P.2d 905. 
The only conduct of Deseret Federal for which this 
doctrine could apply is the fact that Deseret Federal did 
not choose to accelerate the loan between April, 1979 and 
June, 1981. However, there is n£ evidence of record to show 
how Cooper relied upon said lack of acceleration or to show 
how Cooper changed his position because of such conduct 
which would result in his detriment. In fact, Cooper argued 
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at time of trial that he did not have to prove that he was 
"harmed" by the delay. (R. 385-386). This is not the law 
of estoppel. Thus, it is clear from the evidence that 
neither the doctrine of estoppel or waiver is applicable to 
the case at hand. 
A sad effect of the District Court's ruling in this 
matter is that it discourages negotiations between parties. 
Deseret Federal negotiated with Ford and Cooper between 
September, 1981 and Fay, 1982 for the purposes of 
consumating an assumption of the subject loan by Ford. The 
negotiations ended when Cooper refused to assign his 
interest in an escrow account to Ford. During that period 
of time, Deseret Federal did not record a Notice of Default, 
nor refer the matter to an attorney for resolution. 
(R.283-284). However, it would now be more prudent for 
lenders to record their Notices of Default immediately upon 
learning of a default in a ndue-on-salef! clause and then 
negotiate with these various parties. Of course, this would 
add to the expenses of an assumption. 
Because of the transfer of the subject real property 
from Cooper to Ford, Deseret Federal was within its rights 
to accelerate the loan. Relying exclusively upon the 
passing of time, Cooper argued that Deseret Federal is 
barred from asserting its rights under a ffdue-on-salefl 
clause because of laches, waiver and/or estoppel. However, 
the Utah legislature has specified a six(6) year limitation 
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for lenders accelerating their loans. Deseret Federal 
clearly acted within the statutory time constraint when it 
recorded its Notice of Default. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse the Distric Court's judgment and order a 
dismissal with prejudice of Cooper's complaint. 
POINT II: THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR CONTRACTUAL 
BASIS FOR PLAINTIFF'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Under the "American Rule", a litigant is only entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees if a statute or contract so 
provides. B & R Supply Company v. S. M. Bringhurst, 28 U.2d 
442, 503 P2d 1216 (1972). The District Court awarded Cooper 
an attorney's fee of $3,840.00. However, there is no 
evidence in the record to support a legal basis for this 
award. 
The District Court in its Decision and Conclusions of 
Law makes no reference to statutory authority for an award 
of attorney's fees. Cooper's counsel has not pointed to any 
controlling statute which would allow such an award. 
Deseret Federal's review of the record and statutes can 
determine no conceivable basis for the District Court's 
award. 
The contract between Deseret Federal and Cooper 
consists of two (2) documents, a Deed of Trust and Trust 
Deed Note. Both of these documents provided attorney's fees 
for Deseret Federal. Neither of these documents provide for 
attorney's fees for Cooper. 
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The language which permits Deseret Federal to collect 
its attorney's fees is contained in paragraph 18 of the Deed 
of Trust which reads as follows: 
Trustee [Deseret Federal] shall apply the proceeds 
of the Sale in the followng order: (a) to all 
reasonable costs and expenses of the sale, 
including, but not limited to, reasonable 
Trustee's and attorney's fees and costs of title 
evidence... 
The remedies provided to Deseret Federal in paragraph 18 are 
specifically referred to in the "due-on-sale" clause 
(paragraph 17). Additionally, paragraph 18 provides: 
Lender [Deseret Federal] shall be entitled to 
collect all reasonable costs and expenses 
incurred in pursuing the remedies provided 
in this paragraph 18, including, but not 
limited to, attorney's fees. 
None of the wording in either the Deed of Trust or the Trust 
Deed Note provides an award of attorney's fees to a 
borrower. Cooper cannot rely upon a contract for an award 
of attorney's fees. 
Since there is neither statutory authority, nor a 
contractual basis for an award of attorney's fees to Cooper, 
the District Court's judgment is in error. Deseret Federal 
seeks reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Cooper was granted an injunction to prevent Deseret 
Federal from foreclosing a Deed of Trust because of an 
admitted default in "due-on-sale" clause. Deseret Federal 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the District 
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Court's injunction and order a dismissal with prejudice of 
Cooper's complaint. A reversal will permit Deseret Federal 
to accelerate the Cooper loan and complete its non-judicial 
foreclosure. Further, Cooper was awarded a judgment against 
Deseret Federal for his attorney's fees. Deseret Federal 
also requests a reversal of this judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this day of February, 
1986. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
Joseph E. Hatch 
Attorney fcr Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
17 • Transfer of the Property; Assumption, 
If all or any part of the' Property or an interest 
therein is sold or transferred by Borrower without 
Lender's prior written consent, excluding (a) the 
creation of a lien or encumbrance subordinate to 
this Deed of Trust, (b) the creation of a purchase 
money security interest for household appliances, 
(c) a transfer by devise, descent or by operation 
of law upon the death of a joint tenant or (d) the 
grant of any leasehold interest of three years or 
less not containing an option to purchase, Lender 
may, at Lender's option, declare all the sums 
secured by this Deed of Trust to be immediately 
due and payable. Lender shall have waived such 
option to accelerate if, prior to the sale or 
transfer, Lender and the person to whom the 
Property is to be sold or transferred reach 
agreement in writing that the credit of such 
person is satisfactory to Lender and that the 
interest payable on the sums secured by this Deed 
of Trust shall be at such rate as Lender shall 
request. If Lender has waived the option to 
accelerate provided in this paragraph 17, and if 
Borrower's successor in interest has executed a 
written assumption agreement accepted in writing 
by Lender, Lender shall release borrower from all 
obligations under this Deed of Trkist and the Note. 
If Lender exercises such option to accelerate, 
Lender shall mail Borrower notice of acceleration 
in accordance with paragraph 14 hereof. Such 
notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 
days from the date the notice is mailed within 
which Borrower may pay the sums declared due. If 
Borrower fails to pay such sums prior to the 
expiration of such period, Lender may, without 
further notice or demand on Borrower, invoke any 
remedies permitted by paragraph 18 hereof. 
-16-
APPENDIX "B 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK S. COOPER, Civil No, 67397 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . D E C I S I O N 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS 
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court for trial on the 28th day of 
February, 1985. H. Grant Ivins, Esq. appeared for the plaintiff and 
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq. appeared for the defendant. The parties pre-
sented their evidence and oral arguments to the Court, which directed 
that formal citations of authority be submitted by Mr. Hatch allowing 
time for Mr. Ivins to answer if deemed appropriate, and the Court 
having received such citations and further argument from Mr. Hatch and 
having taken the matter under advisement, now enters its: 
DECISION 
There is very little dispute in the evidence. The following is a 
summary of the Court's findings. 
The plaintiff, Jack S. Cooper, was the original borrower from 
defendant in April of 1976, at which time the trust deed securing the 
defendant's loan to Cooper contained the following covenant: 
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"17. Transfer of property; Assumption. If all or any 
part of the property or an interest therein is sold or 
transferred by borrower without lender's prior written con-
sent, exluding . . . lender may at lender's option, declare 
all the sums secured by this deed of trust to be immediately 
due and payable . . . ." 
In May of 1978 plaintiff sold by a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
to Gary Douglas Ford, trustee, the property in question, which 
secured the defendant's loan to Cooper. Neither plaintiff nor Ford 
obtained "prior written consent" for the sale. 
In April, 1979, the file on this loan reflects an insurance 
binder being issued stating Ford to be the owner of the subject 
property. This binder was noted on an indexing card and the actual 
binder placed in the file. (Cooper also testified he and Ford talked 
to an official at Deseret Federal about the sale going through and no 
one advised that a due-on-sale clause would be involved.) 
In June, 1981, Ford was delinquent both to Deseret Federal on 
the original loan, and to Cooper on the real estate contract (or 
second mortgage), and a due-on-sale notice was mailed to Cooper, which 
Cooper denies having received, and for which defendant cannot produce 
proof of mailing. (Undelivered Certified Mail dated August 18, 
apparently with a notice of due-on-sale claim was undelivered and 
apparently addressed to a questionable location in Orem, Utah). 
Defendant continued to meet with Ford to work out his assumption 
of the loan to cure the due-on-sale requirement and in December, 1981 
Ford made a formal application for the assumption of the subject loan. 
Continued negotiations occurred, and in May, when plaintiff was asked 
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to release his escrowed funds to apply on Ford's delinquencies to 
defendant, Cooper refused. 
Nothing further appears to have occurred concerning this matter 
until October 1, 1982, when Ford filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 
Thereafter plaintiff made efforts to and finally did obtain a release 
of the property from the bankruptcy court on or about September 18th, 
1983, and Cooper completed his foreclosure on or about February 1, 
1984, when he was the successful bidder at the Sheriff1s sale and 
title to the property subject to the trust deed in question was vested 
back in him. 
On February, 10, 1984, Deseret Federal sent to and Jack Cooper 
received a letter notifying him of their awareness of the sale of the 
subject property (to Ford in 1978) and a declaration of defendant's 
election to declare the entire balance ($295,247.42) due and payable 
pursuant to paragraph 17 of the trust deed. The notice provided two 
alternatives to foreclosure, which was indicated would be commenced 
within thirty days if neither remedies there set forth were "chosen". 
In June, 1984, Deseret Federal recorded its Notice of Default 
covering the due-on-sale clause, to begin its non-judicial trust deed s 
The Court also finds from the evidence presented that during the 
course of this litigation and with some reservation between counsel 
that it would not have an effect on the waiver claimed by the plaintifi 
substantial money has been paid to defendant by plaintiff in an effort 
to bring the loan in question current. It is also part of the record 
in this proceeding that a tender has been made to defendant by plain-
tiff of some $77,000.00 in addition to the $101,955.00 paid on 
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December 27, 1984 to bring the loan fully current as of a point after 
litigation had commenced. 
It is the plaintiff's position that the failure of the defendant 
to make an election to declare the loan due and payable because of the 
sale to Ford for a period of approximately five years counting the 
period of the bankruptcy, constitutes a waiver of the right to avail 
itself of that provision in the trust deed. 
It is the position of the defendant that after a sale they have 
the right at any time within the period of the loan to exercise the 
due-on-sale provision when such sale is contrary to the restrictions of 
paragraph 17. 
In resolving the issues, the Court enters the following Con-
clusions of Law from the above Findings of Fact: 
1. That the due-on-sale provision in the trust deed 
securing defendant's' loan to plaintiff became operative as 
of the sale to Ford in May of 1978. 
2. That the defendant had actual or constructive 
notice of the aforesaid sale to Ford as of April, 1979/ 
when it received notice of the change of owners through 
an insurance binder. 
3. That further notice of the sale was brought 
to the attention of defendant through conversations 
between Mr. Ford and Mr. Cooper with agents of defendant 
over a period of 1981, which resulted in letters from 
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defendant to Cooper dated June 22, 1981, and August 14, 
1981. Also, conversations with Jean Carter and Ford in 
October and other communications with Ford in November 
and December, 1981, and January and May of 198 2, clearly 
establish the knowledge on the part of defendant that the 
sale had occurred and their option to exercise due-on-sale, 
or affect other remedies had matured. 
4. The due-on-sale provision in Section 17 of the 
trust deed is a provision entitling the lender to 
accelerate the unpaid balance of an installment loan when a 
sale occurs. 
5. The Court concludes that to fail to exercise the 
due-on-sale clause of the trust deed by recording the 
Notice of Default and initiating either judicial or non-
judicial trust deed foreclosure within one year after 
notice of a sale in violation of the due-on-sale provision 
is not exercising the option within a reasonable time, 
which the law would require, since no other time provision 
for the exercise is specified in the trust deed. 
6. The Court further concludes that the failure of 
defendant to accelerate the obligation under the due-on-sale 
clause until after plaintiff had foreclosed the rights of 
Ford and had succeeded to title to the property affects a 
waiver of defendant's rights to proceed under the due-on-
-21-
sale clause# and in addition thereto amounts to an estoppel 
against defendant to proceed toforeclose atthis time. 
Defendant had knowledge of its right to accelerate the 
obligation as of April, 1979 and repeatedly thereafter 
through the time plaintiff foreclosed against Ford, and 
intentionally sat back, negotiated, but but did not 
choose to assert its right while allowing the plaintiff to 
proceed with the expenditure of time and legal costs to 
protect his interests in the property.) 
The Court has reviewed the decisions cited by counsel, and 
although none of them appear to show as extreme fact situation as is 
evident in the case before the Court, there are many decisions con-
cerning what constitutes a reasonable time to exercise the right to 
accelerate an obligation due to the violation of a provision in a 
trust deed or mortgage, and the periods involved in the case before 
the Court run well beyond what the decisions say a reasonable time 
is where time is not otherwise limited in thfe written documents. The 
case of Malouff v. Midland Federal Saving and Loan Association (1973), 
181 Col. 294, 509 P. 2d 1240, holds that " . . . under an ordinary 
acceleration clause in a mortgage or trust deed, the obligee has a 
reasonable time after the default or the event which gives rise to the 
right to accelerate." Even though that case directs a case-by-case 
determination as to what a reasonable time is, the circumstances of 
the case before this Court would indicate a dlear violation of a 
reasonable time to accelerate under such a clause, be it due-on-sale or 
-23-
other default in the security documents of a loan. 
Other cases cited by counsel for the plaitiff are most persuasive 
to the Court and whether the conduct in not exercising the acceleration 
within a reasonable time constitutes a waiver, amounts to an estoppel o 
assesses laches against the party whose actions are tardy, a particular 
analysis of the fact of this case would indicate a clear conclusion tha 
defendants waited too long. The rights accorded a lender by virtue of 
due-on-sale clause does not include carte blanche on a particular loan 
to watch the entire climate of interest rates for a thirty year period 
and at some likely point deemed most advantageous to the lender, requir 
an adjustment or foreclosure from the borrower. 
Based on the foregoing the Court concludes that plaintiff is 
entitled to the relief requested in his Complaint prohibiting the 
defendant from proceeding in its attempt to exercise its due-on-sale 
clause for the sale occuring in 1978, and that the defendant be Ordered 
to accept plaintiff's tender to bring the loan current and that he not 
be charged any penalty interest or late charges from the date of his 
tender of the balance to accomplish that^which was on the 16th day of 
April, 1984. I The Court further finds that the plaintiff is entitled to 
be compensated for the fees and charge of his attorney in this matter 
and_the Affidavit filed by his counsel and not controverted by defense 
counsel establishes the ^sum of $31840.00 ac a reasonable sum to be 
——— ——— * •» 
awarded^o the plaintiff for the use and benefit of his attorney, plus 
the costs of this action. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare appropriate Findings 
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of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order consistant with the 
foregoing Decision. . 
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this ^ day of April, 1985. 
GEOgfJJE E. BALLIF, ^ UDGE 
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APPENDIX "C" 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
75 North Center 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-6071 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
JACK S. COOPER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 67,397 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
-oooOooo-
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial on the 28tl 
day of February, 1985; the plaintiff appearing in person 
and through his counsel, Heber Grant Ivins; the defendant 
appearing with officers of the corporation and through their 
counsel, Joseph E. Hatch; the parties presented evidence 
and oral arguments to the Court; and after due deliberation 
the Court does enter the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on April 15, 1976, the plaintiff borrowed 
the sum of $315,000 from the defendant and executed a trust 
deed and a trust deed note, which, among other provisions, 
contained a non-assumption provision which read as follows: 
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"17. Transfer of property; Assumption. If 
all or any part of the property or an interest therein 
is sold or transferred by borrower without lender's prio 
written consent, excluding...lender may at lender's 
option, declare all the sums secured by this deed of 
trust to be immediately due and payable...." 
2. In May, 1978, the plaintiff sold, by Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, the 24-unit apartment complex which was 
the collateral provided to the defendant, to one Gary Douglas 
Ford, and at the time of said sale, the due-on-sale provision 
in the trust deed, securing defendant's loan to plaintiff, 
became operative. 
3. That the defendant had actual or constructive 
notice of the aforesaid sale to Ford in April, 1979, when 
it received notice of the change of owners through an insuranc 
binder which was present in the file of the defendant. 
4. That further notice of the sale was brought 
to the attention of the defendant through conversations betwee 
Gary Ford, the purchaser, and Mr. Cooper, with agents of the 
defendants throughout 1981, which resulted in letters from 
defendant to Cooper dated June 22, 1981, and August 14, 1981. 
Also, conversations were had with one Jean Carter, and agent 
of the defendant, and Gary Ford in October, 1981, and other 
communications with Ford occurred in November and December 
of 1981 and January and May of 1982, which clearly establishes 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the sale had 
occurred and their option to exercise the due-on-sale provisio 
or other remedies had matured. 
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5. That the due-on-sale provision in Section 17 
of the trust deed is a provision entitling the lender to acc< 
erate the unpaid balance of an installment loan when a sale 
occurs. 
6. That the purchaser, Gary Ford, became delinquer 
on both the contract to the plaintiff and on the assumed obli 
gation to the defendant, in early 1982. 
7. That the plaintiff filed a foreclosure against 
Gary Ford on July 14, 1982, and the defendant was- served witt 
a copy of said foreclosure on July 9, 1982. 
8. That the purchaser, Gary Ford, filed a Chapter 
11 bankruptcy on October 1, 1982, which resulted in an autom< 
tic stay being issued by the bankruptcy court. The stay was 
set aside on September 18, 1983. 
9. That the foreclosure action of the plaintiff 
against Gary Ford was completed and the property was sold 
by the sheriff.of Utah County on February 1, 1984, and was 
purchased by the plaintiff at said sale. 
10. That on or about February 10, 1984, defendant 
sent plaintiff a letter asserting a violation of the due-on-
sale clause and accelerating the loan. 
11. That on April 16-, 1984, the plaintiff tenderec 
to the defendant a check in the amount of $77,813.00, which 
amount was represented to be sufficient to bring the plain-
tiff's note current. 
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12. That on June 5, 1984, the defendant recorded 
in the office of the Utah County Recorder its notice of 
default. 
13. That on December 27, 1984, the plaintiff paid 
and the defendant accepted the sum of $101,955.00, which 
brought the loan fully current as of that date. 
14. That the plaintiff's counsel has expended a 
total of 64 hours in the preparation and trial of this matter, 
and that $60.00 an hour is a reasonable charge for said attor-
ney. 
15. That the sum of $455.71 costs have been expen-
ded in this action. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the failure of the defendant to exercise 
the due-on-sale clause of the trust deed by recording the 
notice of default and initiating either a judicial or 
non-judicial trust deed foreclosure for approximately four 
years after notice of a sale in violation of the due-on-sale 
provision is not exercising the option within a reasonable 
time, which the law requires, and when no other time provision 
for the exercise of said right is specified in the trust deed. 
2. That the failure of the defendant to accelerate 
the obligation under the due-on-sale clause until after plain-
tiff had foreclosed the rights of Gary Ford and had succeeded 
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to title to the property effects a waiver of defendant's rig 
to proceed with their due on sale clause, and in addition 
thereto amounts to an estoppel against the defendant to proc 
to foreclose at this time. 
3. That the plaintiff's loan with the defendant 
was brought current by the payment of $101,955.00 as of the 
27th day of December, 1984. 
4. That the defendant does not, by virtue of a 
due-on-sale clause in a trust deed, have carte blanche right 
to monitor the climate of interest rates for the period of 
said loan and at some point deemed most advantageous to the 
defendant require an adjustment or foreclosure from the 
borrower. 
5. That the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent 
order restraining the defendant from proceeding with its tr 
deed foreclosure action, and further, requiring them to ace 
payments pursuant to the original terms of the trust deed 
and trust deed note signed in April of 1976. 
6. That the plaintiff is entitled to the sum of 
$3,840.00 as attorney's fees for the use and benefit of his 
attorney, plus $455.71 as costs. 
DATED this day of April, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge 
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HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
75 North Center 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Telephone: (801) 756-6071 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOooo-
JACK S. COOPER, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 67,397 
Defendant. 
-oooOooo-
THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial on the 28th 
day of February, 1985; the plaintiff appearing in person 
and through his counsel, Heber Grant Ivins ; the 'defendant 
appearing with officers of the corporation and through their 
counsel, Joseph £. Hatch; the parties presented evidence 
and oral arguments to the Court; and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law having heretofore been entered, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that 
the defendant be, and is hereby, ordered and enjoined from 
taking further action upon the foreclosure of the trust deed 
which has been commenced and is now pending, and 
FURTHER, the defendant is ordered to accept and 
comply with the terms of the original trust deed and trust 
deed note executed by the plaintiff in April pf 1976. 
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Plaintiff is entitled to and is hereby awarded judg-
ment against the defendant in the amount of 
$3,840.00 for the use and benefit of his attorney, together 
with $455.71 in costs. 
DATED this / T ^ a a y of /j(\\1\ 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
J u d g e Ml 
I GRANT IVINS 
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I hereby certify that on the 27th day of February, 
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foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to: 
Mr. Heber Grant Ivins 
Attorney at Law 
75 North Center Street 
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